FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Cen by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-27-2016 
FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Cen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Cen" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 926. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/926 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 16-2365 
______ 
 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION;  
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
                                                         Appellants  
 
v. 
 
PENN STATE HERSHEY MEDICAL CENTER;  
PINNACLE HEALTH SYSTEM  
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 1-15-cv-02362) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
______ 
 
Argued July 26, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 27, 2016) 
 
 
 
2 
 
David C. Shonka, Sr., Acting General Counsel 
Joel R. Marcus, Director of Litigation 
Deborah L. Feinstein 
Michele Arington 
Federal Trade Commission 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20580 
 
William H. Efron  [ARGUED] 
Ryan F. Harsch 
Jared P. Nagley 
Jonathan W. Platt 
Geralyn J. Trujillo 
Federal Trade Commission 
One Bowling Green, Suite 318 
New York, NY 10004 
 Counsel for Federal Trade Commission 
 
Bruce L. Castor, Jr., Solicitor General of Pennsylvania 
Bruce Beemer, First Deputy Attorney General 
James A. Donahue, III, Executive Deputy Attorney General 
Tracy W. Wertz, Chief Deputy Attorney General 
Jennifer Thomson 
Aaron L. Schwartz  
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
Strawberry Square 
Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 Counsel for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Charles I. Artz 
Artz McCarrie Health Law 
200 North 3rd Street, Suite 12-B 
Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 Counsel for Amicus Curiae Association of Independent 
 Doctors  
 
Richard P. Rouco 
Quinn Conner Weaver Davies & Rouco, LLP 
2 - 20th Street North, Suite 930 
Birmingham, AL 35203 
 Counsel for Amici Curiae Economics Professors  
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General of Idaho 
Brett DeLange, Deputy Attorney General 
Office of Attorney General of Idaho 
Consumer Protection Division 
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, ID 83720 
 
Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington 
Darwin P. Roberts, Deputy Attorney General 
Jonathan A. Mark, Senior Assistant Attorney General 
Office of Attorney General of Washington 
Antitrust Division 
800 5th Street, Suite 200 
Seattle, WA 98104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California 
George Jepsen, Attorney General of Connecticut 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General of Maine 
Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General of Minnesota 
Jim Hood, Attorney General of Mississippi 
Tim Fox, Attorney General of Montana 
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon 
Counsel for Amici Curiae States of Idaho, Washington, 
California, Connecticut, Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, and Oregon 
  
William D. Coglianese 
Louis K. Fisher  [ARGUED] 
Julie E. McEvoy 
Christopher N. Thatch 
Adrian Wager-Zito 
Alisha M. Crovetto 
Jon G. Heintz 
Jones Day 
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
James P. DeAngelo 
Kimberly A. Selemba 
McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC 
100 Pine Street 
P.O. Box 1166 
Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 Counsel for Penn State Hershey Medical Center and 
 PinnacleHealth System 
5 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
At issue in this case is the proposed merger of the two 
largest hospitals in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania area: Penn 
State Hershey Medical Center and PinnacleHealth System. 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) opposes their 
merger and filed an administrative complaint alleging that it 
violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act because it is likely to 
substantially lessen competition. In order to maintain the 
status quo and prevent the parties from merging before the 
administrative adjudication could occur, the FTC, joined by 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, filed suit in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania under Section 13(b) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) and Section 16 of the 
Clayton Act, which authorize the FTC and the 
Commonwealth, respectively, to seek a preliminary 
injunction pending the outcome of the FTC’s adjudication on 
the merits. The District Court denied the FTC and the 
Commonwealth’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
holding that they did not properly define the relevant 
geographic market—a necessary prerequisite to determining 
whether a proposed combination is sufficiently likely to be 
anticompetitive as to warrant injunctive relief. For the reasons 
that follow, we will reverse. We will also remand the case and 
direct the District Court to enter the preliminary injunction 
requested by the FTC and the Commonwealth. 
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I. Background 
A. Factual Background 
Penn State Hershey Medical Center (“Hershey”) is a 
leading academic medical center and the primary teaching 
hospital of the Penn State College of Medicine. It is located in 
Hershey, and it offers 551 beds and employs more than 800 
physicians, many of whom are highly specialized. Hershey 
offers all levels of care, but it specializes in more complex, 
specialized services that are unavailable at most other 
hospitals. Because of its advanced services, Hershey draws 
patients from a broad area both inside and outside Dauphin 
County. 
PinnacleHealth System (“Pinnacle”) is a health system 
with three hospital campuses—two located in Harrisburg in 
Dauphin County, and the third located in Mechanicsburg in 
Cumberland County. It focuses on cost-effective primary and 
secondary services and offers only a limited range of more 
complex services. It employs fewer than 300 physicians and 
provides 646 beds. 
In June 2014, Hershey and Pinnacle (collectively, the 
“Hospitals”) signed a letter of intent for the proposed merger. 
Their respective boards subsequently approved the merger in 
March 2015. The following month, the Hospitals notified the 
FTC of their proposed merger and, in May 2015, executed a 
“Strategic Affiliation Agreement.” 
B. Procedural History 
After receiving notification of the proposed merger, 
the FTC began investigating the combination. Following the 
investigation, on December 7, 2015, the FTC filed an 
administrative complaint alleging that the merger violates 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18. On December 
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9, 2015, the FTC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
(collectively, the “Government”) filed suit in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania. Invoking Section 13(b) of the FTC 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 26, the Government sought a preliminary injunction 
pending resolution of the FTC’s administrative adjudication. 
In its complaint, the Government alleged that the Hospitals’ 
merger would substantially lessen competition in the market 
for general acute care services sold to commercial insurers in 
the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania market. Am. Compl. ¶ 4, at 3-4 
(Dist. Ct. ECF 101). According to the Government, the 
combined Hospitals would control 76% of the market in 
Harrisburg. See Gov’t Br. 3-4. 
The District Court conducted expedited discovery and 
held five days of evidentiary hearings. During the hearings, 
the District Court heard testimony from sixteen witnesses and 
admitted thousands of pages of exhibits into evidence. 
Following the hearings, the District Court denied the 
Government’s request for a preliminary injunction on the 
basis that the Government had failed to meet its burden to 
properly define the relevant geographic market. Without a 
properly defined relevant geographic market, the District 
Court held there was no way to determine whether the 
proposed merger was likely to be anticompetitive. Thus, the 
Government could not show a likelihood of success on the 
merits, and its failure to properly define the relevant 
geographic market was fatal to its motion. The District Court 
also analyzed what it called “equities,” which it held 
supported denying the injunction request. The Government 
timely appealed. 
II. Jurisdiction 
The District Court had jurisdiction under Section 13(b) 
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of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), which authorizes the FTC 
to request a preliminary injunction in cases involving 
violations of the Clayton Act, and under Section 16 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, which likewise authorizes the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to seek a preliminary 
injunction. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 1292(a)(1). 
III. Standard of Review 
We begin with the familiar standard of review. We 
review the District Court’s “findings of fact for clear error, its 
conclusions of law de novo, and the ultimate decision to grant 
the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” Miller v. 
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010). This standard, 
though easy enough to articulate, often proves difficult to 
apply, particularly where, as here, we are asked to review 
determinations made by the District Court that cannot be 
neatly categorized as either findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. 
The Government argues that the District Court made 
“three independent legal errors” in rejecting its proffered 
geographic market. Gov’t Br. 26. Because the errors are legal, 
the Government would have us apply no deference to the 
District Court’s determination and exercise plenary review of 
its conclusions. Id. at 30-31. The Hospitals disagree. They 
argue that market definition is a factual dispute to which we 
should apply the most deferential standard: clear error. Hosps. 
Br. 15. 
On several occasions, this Court, and others, have 
reviewed district courts’ determinations of the relevant 
geographic market for clear error. E.g., Gordon v. Lewistown 
Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 211-13 (3d Cir. 2005); St. Alphonsus 
Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 
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F.3d 775, 783-84 (9th Cir. 2015). In determining that clear-
error review applied, the Ninth Circuit in St. Alphonsus 
reasoned that “[d]efinition of the relevant market is a factual 
question ‘dependent upon the special characteristics of the 
industry involved.’” 778 F.3d at 783 (quoting Twin City 
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 
1299 (9th Cir. 1982)). This characterization of the relevant 
market arose from the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
“Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the 
definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic 
one.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 
(1962). Thus, where the definition of the geographic market 
depends on the “special characteristics” of the healthcare 
market, we may not overturn the District Court’s factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
That does not mean, however, that we will always 
review the District Court’s determination of the relevant 
market for clear error. “Although market definition is 
generally regarded as a question of fact, a trial court’s 
determination of the market may be reversed where that 
tribunal has erred as a matter of law.” Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1252 (3d Cir. 1975); 
accord White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 
F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he preponderance of 
authority holds that the determination of a relevant market is 
composed of the articulation of a legal test which is then 
applied to the factual circumstances of each case.”); Little 
Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 
599-600 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that “the theory upon which 
[the plaintiff] relies to reach the conclusion that a single city 
is the relevant geographic market is legally flawed”). 
In American Motor Inns, we held that the district court 
erred as a matter of law where its opinion did “not 
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demonstrate a consideration of sufficient factors to constitute 
the type of economic analysis explicated by the Supreme 
Court.” 521 F.2d at 1252. There, the district court purported 
to apply the correct standard to determine the relevant product 
market. The standard was a three-part test set out in Tampa 
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
Relevant here, the third step of the Tampa Electric analysis 
required the district court to find that “the competition 
foreclosed by the contract … constitute[d] a substantial share 
of the relevant market.” Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1250 
(quoting Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 328). The Supreme Court 
directed lower courts that, to ascertain whether competition in 
a substantial share of the market had been foreclosed, 
it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of 
the contract on the relevant area of effective 
competition, taking into account the relative 
strength of the parties, the proportionate volume 
of commerce involved in relation to the total 
volume of commerce in the relevant market 
area, and the probable immediate and future 
effects which pre-emption of that share of the 
market might have on effective competition 
therein.  
Id. (quoting Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 329). 
Although the district court in American Motor Inns 
cited to Tampa Electric and purported to apply the Tampa 
Electric test, it did not consider the “the probable immediate 
and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the 
market might have within the competitive context of that 
industry, nor did it in any way advert to the relative strength 
of the parties.” Id. at 1252 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
We explained that by failing to consider this factor required 
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by the economic analysis as announced by Tampa Electric, 
the district court applied the incorrect legal standard. And 
application of an incorrect legal standard is error as a matter 
of law. Id. 
Consistent with the teaching of our precedent, where a 
district court applies an incomplete economic analysis or an 
erroneous economic theory to those facts that make up the 
relevant geographic market, it has committed legal error 
subject to plenary review. This understanding of economic 
theory as legal analysis also comports with the Supreme 
Court’s recent observation that it has “felt relatively free to 
revise [its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves 
and … to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a 
practice’s competitive consequences.” Kimble v. Marvel 
Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412-13 (2015). 
As we explain further below, the District Court here 
cited the hypothetical monopolist test and purported to apply 
it. Both the Government and the Hospitals agree that the 
hypothetical monopolist test is the correct standard to apply. 
But the District Court’s application of the hypothetical 
monopolist test was incomplete and, in many respects, more 
closely mirrors an economic test that the FTC has abandoned 
because the test “misperceived a practice’s competitive 
consequences.” Id. at 2413. Although we accept all of the 
District Court’s factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous, this failure to apply the correct legal standard, i.e., 
the economic theory behind the relevant geographic market, 
renders our review plenary.  
IV. Analysis 
The Government alleges that the proposed merger of 
Hershey and Pinnacle violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
In order to prevent the parties from merging until the FTC can 
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conduct an administrative adjudication on the merits to 
determine whether the merger violates Section 7, the 
Government seeks a preliminary injunction under Section 
13(b) of the FTC Act. 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act empowers the FTC to 
file suit in the federal district courts and seek a preliminary 
injunction to prevent a merger pending a FTC administrative 
adjudication “[w]henever the Commission has reason to 
believe that a corporation is violating, or is about to violate, 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.” FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 
F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting FTC v. Staples, Inc., 
970 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (D.D.C. 1997)); see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 53(b). 
A district court may issue a preliminary injunction 
“[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and 
considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, 
such action would be in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 53(b). The public interest standard is not the same as the 
traditional equity standard for injunctive relief. Under Section 
13(b), we first consider the FTC’s likelihood of success on 
the merits and then weigh the equities to determine whether a 
preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. FTC v. 
Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.3d 1206, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 1991). 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
We first consider the FTC’s likelihood of success on 
the merits. In its administrative adjudication, the FTC must 
show that the proposed merger violates Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18. Section 7 bars mergers whose 
effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend 
to create a monopoly.” Id. “Congress used the words ‘may be 
substantially to lessen competition’ … to indicate that its 
concern was with probabilities, not certainties,” Brown Shoe, 
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370 U.S. at 323, rendering Section 7’s definition of antitrust 
liability “relatively expansive.” California v. Am. Stores Co., 
495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990). At this stage, “[t]he FTC is not 
required to establish that the proposed merger would in fact 
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.” H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 
714. Accordingly, “[a] certainty, even a high probability, 
need not be shown,” and any “doubts are to be resolved 
against the transaction.” FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 
901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989). 
We assess Section 7 claims under a burden-shifting 
framework. First, the Government must establish a prima 
facie case that the merger is anticompetitive. If the 
Government establishes a prima facie case, the burden then 
shifts to the Hospitals to rebut it. If the Hospitals successfully 
rebut the Government’s prima facie case, “the burden of 
production shifts back to the Government and merges with 
the ultimate burden of persuasion, which is incumbent on the 
Government at all times.” St. Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 783 
(quoting Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 423 
(5th Cir. 2008)). 
To establish a prima facie case, the Government must 
(1) propose the proper relevant market and (2) show that the 
effect of the merger in that market is likely to be 
anticompetitive. 
1. Relevant Market 
 “Determination of the relevant product and 
geographic markets is ‘a necessary predicate’ to deciding 
whether a merger contravenes the Clayton Act.” United States 
v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974) 
(quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 
U.S. 586, 593 (1957)). “Without a well-defined relevant 
market,” an examination of the merger’s competitive effects 
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would be “without context or meaning.” FTC v. Freeman 
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995). The relevant market 
is defined in terms of two components: the product market 
and the geographic market. Id.; see Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 
324. 
a. Relevant Product Market 
There is no dispute as to the relevant product market. 
The District Court found, and the parties stipulated, that the 
relevant product market is general acute care (“GAC”) 
services sold to commercial payors. App. 9. GAC services 
comprise a number of “medical and surgical services that 
require an overnight hospital stay.” Id. Though the parties 
agree as to the relevant product market, the Hospitals strongly 
dispute the relevant geographic market put forth by the 
Government.  
b. Relevant Geographic Market 
The relevant geographic market “is that area in which 
a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services 
he seeks.” Gordon, 423 F.3d at 212. Determined within the 
specific context of each case, a market’s geographic scope 
must “correspond to the commercial realities of the industry” 
being considered and “be economically significant.” Brown 
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336-37 (footnote and internal quotation 
marks omitted). The plaintiff (here, the Government) bears 
the burden of establishing the relevant geographic market. St. 
Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 784. 
A common method employed by courts and the FTC to 
determine the relevant geographic market is the hypothetical 
monopolist test. Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
issued by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division 
and the FTC, if a hypothetical monopolist could impose a 
small but significant non-transitory increase in price 
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(“SSNIP”)1 in the proposed market, the market is properly 
defined. Merger Guidelines, § 4, at 7-8.2 If, however, 
consumers would respond to a SSNIP by purchasing the 
product from outside the proposed market, thereby making 
the SSNIP unprofitable, the proposed market definition is too 
narrow. Id. Important for our purposes, both the Government 
and the Hospitals agree that this test should govern the instant 
appeal. See Gov’t Br. 25; Hosps. Br. 17-20. 
The Government argues, as it did before the District 
Court, that the relevant geographic market is the “Harrisburg 
area.” More specifically, the four counties encompassing and 
immediately surrounding Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Dauphin, 
Cumberland, Lebanon, and Perry counties. 
The District Court rejected the Government’s proposed 
geographic market. It first observed that 43.5% of Hershey’s 
patients—11,260 people—travel to Hershey from outside the 
four-county area, which “strongly indicate[d] that the FTC 
had created a geographic market that [was] too narrow 
because it does not appropriately account for where the 
Hospitals, particularly Hershey, draw their business.” App. 
13. Second, it held that the nineteen hospitals within a sixty-
five-minute drive of Harrisburg “would readily offer 
consumers an alternative” to accepting a SSNIP. Id. Finally, 
the District Court found it “extremely compelling” that the 
Hospitals had entered into private agreements with the two 
                                              
1 The SSNIP is typically about 5%. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, § 4.1.2, at 10 (2010) (“Merger Guidelines”). 
2 “Although the Merger Guidelines are not binding on 
the courts, they are often used as persuasive authority.” St. 
Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 784 n.9 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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largest insurers in Central Pennsylvania, ensuring that post-
merger rates would not increase for five years with one 
insurer and ten years with the other. App. 13-14. Refusing to 
“blind [itself] to this reality,” the District Court declined to 
“prevent [the] merger based on a prediction of what might 
happen to negotiating position and rates in 5 years.” App. 14. 
The failure to propose the proper relevant geographic market 
was fatal to the Government’s motion, and the District Court 
denied the preliminary injunction request.  
We conclude that the District Court erred in both its 
formulation and its application of the proper legal test. 
Although the District Court correctly identified the 
hypothetical monopolist test, its decision reflects neither the 
proper formulation nor the correct application of that test. We 
find three errors in the District Court’s analysis. First, by 
relying almost exclusively on the number of patients that 
enter the proposed market, the District Court’s analysis more 
closely aligns with a discredited economic theory, not the 
hypothetical monopolist test. Second, the District Court 
focused on the likely response of patients to a price increase, 
completely neglecting any mention of the likely response of 
insurers. Third, the District Court grounded its reasoning, in 
part, on the private agreements between the Hospitals and two 
insurers, even though these types of private contracts are not 
relevant to the hypothetical monopolist test.  
i. Formulation of the Legal Test 
In formulating the legal standard for the relevant 
geographic market, the District Court relied primarily on the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Little Rock Cardiology, 591 F.3d 
591. According to the District Court, to determine the 
geographic market, a court must apply a two-part test. First, it 
must determine “the market area in which the seller operates, 
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its trade area.” App. 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Little Rock Cardiology, 591 F.3d at 598). Second, it 
“must then determine whether a plaintiff has alleged a 
geographic market in which only a small percentage of 
purchasers have alternative suppliers to whom they could 
practicably turn in the event that a defendant supplier’s 
anticompetitive actions result in a price increase.” Id. 
(quoting Little Rock Cardiology, 591 F.3d at 598). Under the 
District Court’s inquiry, the “end goal” of the relevant 
geographic market analysis is “to delineate a geographic area 
where, in the medical setting, few patients leave … and few 
patients enter.” Id. (alteration in original; internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Little Rock Cardiology, 591 F.3d at 
598).  
This formulation of the relevant geographic market test 
is inconsistent with the hypothetical monopolist test. Rather, 
it is one-half of a different test utilized in non-healthcare 
markets to define the relevant geographic market: the 
Elzinga-Hogarty test. The Elzinga-Hogarty test consists of 
two separate measurements: first, the number of customers 
who come from outside the proposed market to purchase 
goods and services from inside of it, and, second, the number 
of customers who reside inside the market but leave that 
market to purchase goods and services.  
The Elzinga-Hogarty test was once the preferred 
method to analyze the relevant geographic market and was 
employed by many courts. See, e.g., California v. Sutter 
Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1020-24 (N.D. Cal. 2001); 
FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1217-21 (W.D. 
Mo.), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Rockford Mem’l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1266-78 (N.D. Ill. 
1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990). But subsequent 
empirical research demonstrated that utilizing patient flow 
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data to determine the relevant geographic market resulted in 
overbroad markets with respect to hospitals. Professor 
Elzinga himself testified before the FTC that this method 
“was not an appropriate method to define geographic markets 
in the hospital sector.” In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 
2007 WL 2286195, at *64 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007). 
The Hospitals dispute that the District Court’s 
formulation of the relevant geographic market standard is the 
Elzinga-Hogarty test. The District Court’s opinion does not 
specifically name or address Elzinga-Hogarty; neither does 
the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Little Rock Cardiology. But 
Little Rock Cardiology’s statement that the market is one in 
which “‘few’ patients leave … and ‘few’ patients enter,” 591 
F.2d at 598 (alteration in original), is a direct quote from 
Rockford Memorial, 717 F. Supp. at 1267. 
In Rockford Memorial, the Northern District of 
Illinois, after observing that, “[i]deally, an area should be 
delineated where ‘few’ patients leave an area and ‘few’ 
patients enter an area to obtain hospital services,” 
immediately outlined a step-by-step methodology put forward 
by the defendants’ expert “to implement the Elzinga-Hogarty 
test.” Id. This methodology proceeded as follows: first, 
determine the merging hospitals’ service area; second, 
determine the collective service area of all hospitals located 
within the merging hospitals’ service area (this area satisfies 
the “little out from inside” test); finally, determine the area 
containing those hospitals that supply 90% of all the business 
that comes from patients residing in the collective service 
area (this area satisfies the “little in from outside” test). Id.  
The standard articulated by the District Court in this 
case parallels the standard from Rockford Memorial, which 
the Rockford Memorial court acknowledged was based on 
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Elzinga-Hogarty. And the District Court’s analysis here 
proceeded in accordance with the way it articulated the 
standard. Consistent with this “few patients leave … and few 
patients enter” test, the District Court relied primarily on the 
fact that 43.5% of Hershey’s patients travel from outside of 
the Harrisburg area (the Government’s proposed geographic 
market) in order to receive GAC services. This number is a 
measure of patient inflows—one of the two primary 
measurements relevant to the Elzinga-Hogarty analysis.  
As the amici curiae Economics Professors3 have 
persuasively demonstrated, patient flow data—such as the 
43.5% number emphasized by the District Court—is 
particularly unhelpful in hospital merger cases because of two 
problems: the “silent majority fallacy” and the “payor 
problem.” See Br. of Amici Curiae Economics Professors 11-
17. “The silent majority fallacy is the false assumption that 
patients who travel to a distant hospital to obtain care 
significantly constrain the prices that the closer hospital 
charges to patients who will not travel to other hospitals.” 
Evanston Nw., 2007 WL 2286195, at *64 (citing testimony of 
Professor Elzinga). The constraining effect is non-existent 
because patient decisions are based mostly on non-price 
factors, such as location or quality of services. This fallacy is 
particularly salient here, where the District Court relied 
almost exclusively on the fact that Hershey attracts many 
patients from outside of the Harrisburg area. In deciding that 
patients who travel to Hershey would turn to other hospitals 
outside of Harrisburg if the merger gave rise to higher prices, 
                                              
3 Amici are a group of 36 economics professors—
including Professor Elzinga—who argue that the District 
Court engaged in faulty economic reasoning, particularly with 
regard to geographic market definition. 
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the District Court did not consider that Hershey is a leading 
academic medical center that provides highly complex 
medical services. We are skeptical that patients who travel to 
Hershey for these complex services would turn to other 
hospitals in the area.  
Although the District Court did not employ strict 
cutoffs to determine whether too many patients enter or leave 
the proposed market, the silent majority fallacy renders the 
test employed by the District Court unreliable even in the 
absence of precise thresholds. In other words, the inadequacy 
of using patient flow data to determine the geographic market 
does not depend on whether the District Court used an exact 
percentage or whether it used a more flexible approach: 
relying solely on patient flow data is not consistent with the 
hypothetical monopolist test.4   
                                              
4 The Hospitals further dispute that the District Court 
applied the Elzinga-Hogarty test because, according to the 
Hospitals, Elzinga-Hogarty is a “static” test in which courts 
look at patient inflows and outflows and, upon reaching a 
certain threshold, stop the inquiry and decide whether the 
numbers support the relevant geographic market. The 
Hospitals characterize the District Court’s analysis as 
“dynamic,” claiming that, although it considered the patient 
inflow measure, it did not stop at that finding. The difference, 
the Hospitals claim, is that the District Court considered that 
these patients—the 43.5% that travel to Hershey—could 
practicably utilize a different hospital to defeat a price 
increase. However, in arriving at the conclusion that patients 
would turn to other hospitals, the District Court relied 
exclusively on this measure of patient inflow, save its 
observation that Central Pennsylvania is largely rural and 
often requires driving large distances for services. App. 13. 
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Moreover, even assuming that relying strictly on 
patient flow data is consistent with the hypothetical 
monopolist test, the District Court did not consider the other 
half of the equation: patient outflows. The Government 
presented undisputed evidence that 91% of patients who live 
in Harrisburg receive GAC services in the Harrisburg area. 
Gov’t Br. 10.5 Such a high number of patients who do not 
travel long distances for healthcare supports the 
Government’s contention that GAC services are inherently 
local and that, in turn, payors would not be able to market a 
healthcare plan to Harrisburg-area residents that did not 
include Harrisburg-area hospitals. Although the District Court 
was not required to cite every piece of evidence it received, or 
even on which it relied, citing only patient inflows and 
ignoring patient outflows creates a misleading picture of the 
relevant geographic market. 
ii. Likely Response of Payors 
The next problem with utilizing patient flow data—the 
payor problem—underscores the second error committed by 
the District Court. By utilizing patient flow data as its primary 
evidence that the relevant market was too narrow, the District 
Court failed to properly account for the likely response of 
insurers in the face of a SSNIP. In fact, it completely 
neglected any mention of the insurers in the healthcare 
market. This incorrect focus reflects a misunderstanding of 
the “commercial realities” of the healthcare market. Brown 
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336.  
As the FTC and several courts have recognized, the 
                                              
5 We cite to the parties’ briefs for facts in the sealed 
record that have been made public by virtue of the parties’ 
without objection including them in their publicly-filed briefs. 
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healthcare market is represented by a two-stage model of 
competition. See St. Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 784 n.10 (calling 
the two-stage model the “accepted model”). In the first stage, 
hospitals compete to be included in an insurance plan’s 
hospital network. In the second stage, hospitals compete to 
attract individual members of an insurer’s plan. Gregory 
Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 
Antitrust L.J. 671, 672 (2000). Patients are largely insensitive 
to healthcare prices because they utilize insurance, which 
covers the majority of their healthcare costs. Because of this, 
our analysis must focus, at least in part, on the payors who 
will feel the impact of any price increase. Id. at 682, 692. 
The Hospitals argue that there is no fundamental 
difference between analyzing the likely response of 
consumers through the patient or the payor perspective. We 
disagree. Patients are relevant to the analysis, especially to the 
extent that their behavior affects the relative bargaining 
positions of insurers and hospitals as they negotiate rates. But 
patients, in large part, do not feel the impact of price 
increases.6 Insurers do. And they are the ones who negotiate 
                                              
6 The Hospitals put forth evidence that patients are 
becomingly increasingly sensitive to prices. Hosps. Br. 29. 
We do not disagree. But despite the increasing sensitivity of 
patients to pricing—e.g., through high-deductible plans, 
coinsurance, and tiered networks—the majority of patients do 
not feel the impact of the price of a specific procedure or at a 
specific hospital. The Hospitals’ own study showed that only 
2% of respondents considered out-of-pocket costs in choosing 
a hospital. Corrected Reply Br. 24. Moreover, the Hospitals 
have not drawn our attention to any specific evidence about 
the use of health plans that would result in price sensitivity to 
patients. 
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directly with the hospitals to determine both reimbursement 
rates and the hospitals that will be included in their networks.  
Imagine that a hospital raised the cost of a procedure 
from $1,000 to $2,000. The patient who utilizes health 
insurance will still have the same out-of-pocket costs before 
and after the price increase. It is the insurer who will bear the 
immediate impact of that price increase. Not until the insurer 
passes that cost on to the patient in the form of higher 
premiums will the patient feel the impact of that price 
increase. And even then, the cost will be spread among many 
insured patients; it will not be felt solely by the patient who 
receives the higher-priced procedure. This is the commercial 
reality of the healthcare market as it exists today. 
Thus, consistent with the mandate to determine the 
relevant geographic market taking into account the 
commercial realities of the specific industry involved, Brown 
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336, when we apply the hypothetical 
monopolist test, we must also do so through the lens of the 
insurers: if enough insurers, in the face of a small but 
significant non-transitory price increase, would avoid the 
price increase by looking to hospitals outside the proposed 
geographic market, then the market is too narrow. This view 
has been confirmed by several courts. E.g., St. Alphonsus, 778 
F.3d at 784 & n.10; see also FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 
852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083-85 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (concluding 
that managed care organizations will not be an effective 
constraint on the ability of the merged entity to use its market 
power to raise prices). It is also consistent with the FTC’s 
view. In re ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2012 WL 1155392, 
at *1-10, *23 n.28 (F.T.C. Mar. 28, 2012), adopted as 
modified, 2012 WL 2450574 (F.T.C. June 25, 2012). It was 
error for the District Court to completely disregard the role 
that insurers play in the healthcare market.  
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We do not mean to suggest that, in the healthcare 
context, considering the effect of a price increase on patients 
constitutes error standing alone. Patients, of course, are 
relevant. For instance, an antitrust defendant may be able to 
demonstrate that enough patients would buy a health plan 
marketed to them with no in-network hospital in the proposed 
geographic market. It would necessarily follow that those 
patients who purchased the health plan would have to turn to 
hospitals outside the relevant market (lest they pay significant 
out-of-pocket costs for an out-of-network hospital). In this 
scenario, patient response is clearly important, but it is not 
important with respect to patients’ response to the price 
increase demanded by the post-merger Hospitals. The District 
Court here did not address this correlated behavior. And 
although it is possible that this scenario could play out in 
some healthcare market, to assume that it would in Harrisburg 
defies the payors’ testimony. The payors repeatedly said that 
they could not successfully market a plan in the Harrisburg 
area without Hershey and Pinnacle. In fact, one payor that 
attempted to do just that (with Holy Spirit, a Harrisburg-area 
hospital, no less) lost half of its membership. Gov’t Br. 13-14. 
That is to say nothing about whether payors would be able to 
successfully market a plan without any Harrisburg-area 
hospital, which is the less burdensome question the 
Government was tasked with answering under the 
hypothetical monopolist test.  
iii. Private Pricing Agreements 
Finally, the District Court erred in resting part of its 
analysis of the relevant geographic market on the private 
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agreements between the Hospitals and the payors.7 The 
District Court found it “extremely compelling” that the 
Hospitals had already entered into contractual agreements 
with two of Central Pennsylvania’s largest payors to maintain 
the existing rate structure for five years with Payor A and ten 
years with Payor B. App. 13-14. Because of the agreements, 
the District Court believed that the FTC was “asking the 
Court [to] prevent this merger based on a prediction of what 
might happen to negotiating position and rates in 5 years.” 
                                              
7 The Hospitals argue that the District Court did not 
rest its decision on the private agreements, and that, in fact, it 
had already come to the conclusion that the relevant 
geographic market was too narrow before it even discussed 
the private agreements. Although it is impossible for us to 
know the exact extent of the District Court’s consideration of 
and reliance on the price agreements, the District Court 
clearly used the price agreements in its assessment of the 
relevant geographic market when, after noting that the 
Hospitals cannot walk away from the two insurers or raise 
their rates for at least five years, it stated: 
The Court simply cannot be blind to this reality 
when considering the import of the hypothetical 
monopolist test advanced by the Merger 
Guidelines. Thus, the FTC is essentially asking 
the Court [to] prevent this merger based on a 
prediction of what might happen to negotiating 
position and rates in 5 years.  
App. 14. And regardless of whether the private agreements 
were the sole basis for, or only a part of, the District Court’s 
decision, we conclude that they are not at all relevant to the 
economic analysis. Thus, considering them, even if not 
relying on them, is error. 
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App. 14. It declined to make such a prediction “[i]n the 
rapidly-changing arena of healthcare and health insurance.” 
Id. 
This reasoning is flawed. We have previously 
cautioned that, in determining the relevant product market, 
private contracts are not to be considered. See Queen City 
Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438-39 (3d 
Cir. 1997). This same reasoning applies to the relevant 
geographic market. In determining the relevant market, we 
“look[] not to the contractual restraints assumed by a 
particular plaintiff,” id., but instead, we answer whether a 
hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a SSNIP.  
For this reason, private contracts between merging 
parties and their customers have no place in the relevant 
geographic market analysis. The hypothetical monopolist test 
is exactly what its name suggests: hypothetical. This is for 
good reason. If we considered the agreements, then our 
inquiry would be simple: the Hospitals would not be able to 
profitably impose a SSNIP because the agreements forbid 
them from doing so. Determination of the relevant geographic 
market is a task for the courts, not for the merging entities. 
Although the District Court declined to predict what might 
happen to negotiating position and rates, making predictions 
about parties’ and consumers’ behavior is exactly what we are 
asked to do. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 
321, 362 (1963) (noting that the question “whether the effect 
of the merger ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ in 
the relevant market” requires a “prediction of [the merger’s] 
impact upon competitive conditions in the future”).  
Moreover, if we allowed such private contracts to 
impact our analysis, any merging entity could enter into 
similar agreements—that may or may not be enforceable—to 
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impermissibly broaden the scope of the relevant geographic 
market. This would enable antitrust defendants to escape 
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. See Queen City 
Pizza, 124 F.3d at 438 (“Were we to adopt plaintiffs’ position 
that contractual restraints render otherwise identical products 
non-interchangeable for purposes of relevant market 
definition, any exclusive dealing arrangement, output or 
requirement contract, or franchise tying agreement would 
support a claim for violation of antitrust laws.”). Although 
private pricing agreements may be an effective tool for the 
FTC and merging parties to utilize in regulatory actions, they 
have no place in the antitrust analysis we engage in today.  
*        *        * 
These errors together render the District Court’s 
analysis economically unsound and not reflective of the 
commercial reality of the healthcare market. In recent years, 
economists have concluded that the use of patient flow data 
does not accurately portray the relevant geographic market in 
the hospital merger context. Instead, economists have 
proposed, and the FTC has implemented, the hypothetical 
monopolist test. The realities of the healthcare market—in 
which payors negotiate prices for GAC services and will 
therefore feel the impact of any price increase—dictate that 
we consider the payors in our analysis. The District Court did 
not properly formulate the hypothetical monopolist test, nor 
did it properly apply that test. Because our antitrust analysis 
must be consistent with the evolution of economic 
understanding, Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412-13, and must be 
tied to the commercial realities of the specific industry at 
issue, Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336, we hold that the District 
Court committed legal error in failing to properly formulate 
and apply the hypothetical monopolist test.  
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We emphasize, however, that our holding is narrow. 
We are not suggesting that the hypothetical monopolist test is 
the only test that the district courts may use in determining 
whether the Government has met its burden to properly define 
the relevant geographic market. In our case, the District 
Court, the Hospitals, and the Government all agreed that the 
hypothetical monopolist test was the proper standard to apply. 
The District Court identified the standard and purported to 
apply it. But in doing so, it incorrectly defined and misapplied 
that standard. This was error. 
iv. The Government Has Properly Defined the Relevant 
Geographic Market 
Our conclusion that the District Court incorrectly 
formulated and misapplied the proper standard does not end 
the inquiry. We must still determine whether the Government 
has met its burden to properly define the relevant geographic 
market. We conclude that it has. 
The Government presented extensive evidence 
showing that insurers would have no choice but to accept a 
price increase from a combined Hershey/Pinnacle in lieu of 
excluding the Hospitals from their networks. First, two of 
Central Pennsylvania’s largest insurers—Payor A and Payor 
B—testified that they could not successfully market a 
network to employers without including at least one of the 
Hospitals. Gov’t Br. 13-14, 37-38. Payor A’s representative 
stated in his deposition that “[y]ou wouldn’t have a whole lot 
of choice” if Hershey and Pinnacle raised their prices 
following a merger and there was no price agreement; that 
“there would be no network without” a combined Hershey 
and Pinnacle; and that the combined entity would have more 
bargaining leverage. Id. at 14; see Corrected Reply Br. 13-14. 
He estimated that the insurer would lose half of its 
29 
 
membership in Dauphin County if they tried to market a plan 
that excluded Pinnacle and Hershey. Gov’t Br. 13-14; 
Corrected Reply Br. 14 n.9.  
He further testified that the insurer previously used the 
possibility of creating a network that included only Holy 
Spirit and Hershey in the Harrisburg market in order to get 
Pinnacle to accept lower prices. Corrected Reply Br. 13. 
According to him, insurers used the separate existence of 
Pinnacle and Hershey at the bargaining table: in order to 
resist a large price increase from Pinnacle, Payor A 
threatened to form a network with Holy Spirit and Hershey, 
excluding Pinnacle. After making this threat, Payor A and 
Pinnacle were able to come to an agreement that included 
only modest rate increases. The representative conceded that, 
without the ability to create a network with Hershey, this 
threat would not have been credible—Payor A could not have 
threatened to form a network with only Holy Spirit. Gov’t Br. 
15. This is strong evidence that the separate existence of 
Pinnacle and Hershey constrains prices. 
A representative from a second large insurer, Payor B, 
also expressed concerns that the Hospitals would control 
greater than 50% of the market and would have too much 
leverage. Gov’t Br. 16, 38. He testified that the insurer would 
need to market a combined Hershey/Pinnacle in its network in 
order to be marketable. Id. at 14-15, 37-38; Corrected Reply 
Br. 14. Employers in the area similarly stated that they would 
have a difficult time marketing a health plan without the 
Hospitals after the merger. Corrected Reply Br. 20 n.12. 
The results of one natural experiment also support the 
insurer’s testimony. From 2000 until 2014, Payor E was able 
to market a viable network in Harrisburg that included only 
Holy Spirit and Pinnacle but did not include Hershey. In 
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August 2014, Pinnacle terminated its agreement with Payor 
E. After losing Pinnacle from its network, Payor E negotiated 
substantial discounts with Holy Spirit and large hospitals in 
York and Lancaster counties and was able to offer plans at a 
substantial discount. Despite being priced much lower than its 
competitors, Payor E lost half its members, who switched to 
other health plans. Gov’t Br. 13-14. Brokers informed the 
Payor E representative that it no longer had a viable network 
without Pinnacle, and even in the face of substantial discounts 
for Payor E’s health plan, patients were willing to pay more 
to other insurers for health plans that included Hershey or 
Pinnacle. Corrected Reply Br. 16. 
Finally, payors testified that they consider the 
Harrisburg area a distinct market and do not consider 
hospitals in other areas, such as York or Lancaster counties, 
to be suitable alternatives. Gov’t Br. 18 & n.4. 
The Hospitals argue that the payors have enough 
bargaining leverage that they would be able to defeat a 
SSNIP. In the Hospitals’ view, the payors, which supply 
patients to the Hospitals, can threaten to exclude the Hospitals 
from their network; this would in turn cause the Hospitals to 
lose significant numbers of patients. Such a loss would render 
the SSNIP unprofitable and therefore does not satisfy the 
hypothetical monopolist test. No one disputes that the parties 
both have bargaining leverage when negotiating 
reimbursement rates. The question here, however, is whether 
the merger will cause such a significant increase in the 
Hospitals’ bargaining leverage that they will be able to 
profitably impose a SSNIP and, in the face of demand for the 
SSNIP, whether the payors will be forced to accept it. In other 
words, whatever leverage the payors will have after the 
merger, they have that leverage now. The Government’s 
evidence shows that the increase in the Hospitals’ bargaining 
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leverage as a result of the merger will allow the post-merger 
combined Hershey/Pinnacle to profitably impose a SSNIP on 
payors. 
All of the aforementioned evidence answered an even 
narrower question than the one presented: the Government 
was not required to show that payors would accept a price 
increase rather than excluding the merged Hershey/Pinnacle 
entity from their networks; it was required to show only that 
payors would accept a price increase rather than excluding all 
of the hospitals in the Harrisburg area. That is the inquiry 
under the hypothetical monopolist test. Considering the 
evidence put forth by the Government, we conclude that the 
Government has met its burden to properly define the relevant 
geographic market. It is the four-county Harrisburg area.  
2. Prima Facie Case 
“Once the relevant geographic market is determined, a 
prima facie case is established if the plaintiff proves that the 
merger will probably lead to anticompetitive effects in that 
market.” St. Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 785. Market 
concentration is a useful indicator of the likely competitive, 
or anticompetitive, effects of a merger. Merger Guidelines, 
§ 5.3, at 18; see also H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 715-16 
(“Increases in concentration above certain levels are thought 
to raise a likelihood of interdependent anticompetitive 
conduct.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).  
Market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (“HHI”). The HHI is calculated by 
summing the squares of the individual firms’ market shares. 
In determining whether the HHI demonstrates a high market 
concentration, we consider both the post-merger HHI number 
and the increase in the HHI resulting from the merger. 
Merger Guidelines, § 5.3, at 18-19. A post-merger market 
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with a HHI above 2,500 is classified as “highly 
concentrated,” and a merger that increases the HHI by more 
than 200 points is “presumed to be likely to enhance market 
power.” Id. § 5.3, at 19.  The Government can establish a 
prima facie case simply by showing a high market 
concentration based on HHI numbers. See St. Alphonsus, 778 
F.3d at 788 (“The extremely high HHI on its own establishes 
the prima facie case.”); H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 716 
(“Sufficiently large HHI figures establish the FTC’s prima 
facie case that a merger is anti-competitive.”). 
The Government put forth undisputed evidence that 
the post-merger HHI is 5,984—more than twice that of a 
highly concentrated market. The increase in HHI is 2,582—
well beyond the 200-point increase that is presumed likely to 
enhance market power. Gov’t Br. 20. These numbers, the 
accuracy of which the Hospitals conceded at oral argument, 
are significantly higher than post-merger HHIs and HHI 
increases that other courts have deemed presumptively 
anticompetitive. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 
F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2014) (post-merger HHI of 4,391 and 
HHI increase of 1,078 was presumptively anticompetitive), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (2015); H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 
716 (post-merger HHI of 4,775 and HHI increase of 510 was 
presumptively anticompetitive). Furthermore, the 
Government has alleged that the post-merger combined 
Hershey/Pinnacle will control 76% of the market in 
Harrisburg. Gov’t Br. 3-4, 20. Together, these numbers 
demonstrate that the merger is presumptively anticompetitive. 
3. Rebutting the Prima Facie Case 
Once the Government has established a prima facie 
case that the merger may substantially lessen competition, the 
burden shifts to the Hospitals to rebut the Government’s 
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prima facie case. In order to rebut the prima facie case, the 
Hospitals must show either that the combination would not 
have anticompetitive effects or that the anticompetitive 
effects of the merger will be offset by extraordinary 
efficiencies resulting from the merger. See H.J. Heinz, 246 
F.3d at 718-25. The Hospitals present two efficiencies-based 
defenses. First, they put forth considerable evidence in an 
attempt to show that the merger will produce procompetitive 
effects, including relieving Hershey’s capacity constraints and 
allowing Hershey to avoid construction of an expensive bed 
tower that would save $277 million—savings which could be 
passed on to patients. Second, the Hospitals claim that the 
merger will enhance their efforts to engage in risk-based 
contracting. And finally, in addition to their efficiencies 
defense, the Hospitals argue that, because of repositioning by 
other hospitals in the area, the merger will not have 
anticompetitive effects.  
a. Efficiencies Defense 
We note at the outset that we have never formally 
adopted the efficiencies defense. Neither has the Supreme 
Court. Contrary to endorsing such a defense, the Supreme 
Court has instead, on three occasions, cast doubt on its 
availability. First, in Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court, though 
acknowledging that mergers may sometimes produce benefits 
that flow to consumers, reasoned that “Congress appreciated 
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It 
resolved these competing considerations in favor of 
decentralization.” 370 U.S. at 344. Next, in Philadelphia 
National Bank, the Supreme Court made clear that 
a merger the effect of which “may be 
substantially to lessen competition” is not saved 
because, on some ultimate reckoning of social 
34 
 
or economic debits and credits, it may be 
deemed beneficial. … Congress determined to 
preserve our traditionally competitive economy. 
It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, 
the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, 
we must assume, that some price might have to 
be paid.  
374 U.S. at 371. Finally, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
386 U.S. 568 (1967), the Supreme Court cautioned that 
“[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to 
illegality.” Id. at 580.8 
Based on this language and on the Clayton Act’s 
silence on the issue, we are skeptical that such an efficiencies 
defense even exists. Nevertheless, other courts of appeals 
have held that the efficiencies defense is cognizable. E.g., 
Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1222 (“We think … that an 
efficiency defense to the government’s prima facie case in 
section 7 challenges is appropriate in certain 
circumstances.”). And still others have analyzed the 
efficiencies to determine whether they might overcome the 
presumption of illegality. See St. Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 788-
                                              
8 Some commentators have argued that, because the 
efficiencies defense has never been squarely presented to the 
Supreme Court, the issue has never been definitively decided. 
Moreover, they suggest that, although possible economies are 
not a defense, efficiencies that do not lessen competition and 
are certain, as opposed to merely possible, may be enough to 
rebut the presumption of illegality. See Mark N. Berry, 
Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In Search of a Defense, 
33 San Diego L. Rev. 515, 525 (1996); Timothy J. Muris, The 
Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 381, 412-13 (1980). 
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92 (expressing skepticism that the defense exists but 
nevertheless addressing it); H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720 
(acknowledging that the Supreme Court has never 
“sanctioned the use of the efficiencies defense,” but noting 
that “the trend among lower courts is to recognize the 
defense”); see also ProMedica Health, 749 F.3d at 571 
(recognizing that merging parties often put forth the 
efficiencies defense). The FTC’s Merger Guidelines also 
recognize the defense. See Merger Guidelines, § 10, at 30 
(“The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable 
efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that the 
merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant 
market.”). Because we conclude that the Hospitals cannot 
clearly show that their claimed efficiencies will offset any 
anticompetitive effects of the merger, we need not decide 
whether to adopt or reject the efficiencies defense. However, 
because the District Court concluded otherwise, we address 
the requirements of the efficiencies defense and each of the 
Hospitals’ claimed benefits in turn. 
Those courts of appeals to recognize the defense have 
articulated several requirements, which are also found in the 
Merger Guidelines. In order to be cognizable, the efficiencies 
must, first, offset the anticompetitive concerns in highly 
concentrated markets. See St. Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 790. 
Second, the efficiencies must be “merger specific,” id.—
meaning, “they must be efficiencies that cannot be achieved 
by either company alone.” H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 722. 
Otherwise, “the merger’s … benefits [could] be achieved 
without the concomitant loss of a competitor.” Id. Third, the 
efficiencies “must be verifiable, not speculative,” St. 
Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 791; they “must be shown in what 
economists label ‘real’ terms.” Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 
1223 (quoting Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 604 (Harlan, J., 
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concurring)). Finally, the efficiencies must not arise from 
anticompetitive reductions in output or service. Merger 
Guidelines, § 10, at 30.  
Remaining cognizant that the “language of the Clayton 
Act must be the linchpin of any efficiencies defense,” and that 
the Clayton Act speaks in terms of “competition,” we must 
emphasize that “a successful efficiencies defense requires 
proof that a merger is not, despite the existence of a prima 
facie case, anticompetitive.” St. Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 790. 
The presumption of illegality may be overcome only where 
the defendants “demonstrate that the intended acquisition 
would result in significant economies and that these 
economies ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, 
consumers.” Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1223.   
Efficiencies are not the same as equities. In assessing 
whether a preliminary injunction may issue in a Section 7 
case, a court must always weigh the equities as part of its 
determination that granting the injunction would be in the 
public interest. This essential step is expressly required by 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act: “Upon a proper showing that, 
weighing the equities and considering the Commission’s 
likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the 
public interest … a preliminary injunction may be granted … 
.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (emphasis added). The efficiencies 
defense, on the other hand, is a means to show that any 
anticompetitive effects of the merger will be offset by 
efficiencies that will ultimately benefit consumers. It is not 
mentioned in Section 7 of the Clayton Act, nor is it part of the 
standard for granting a preliminary injunction.  
Some of the considerations may overlap, but they are 
properly viewed as distinct inquiries, in part, because of the 
rigorous standard that applies to efficiencies, which must be 
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merger specific, verifiable, and must not arise from any 
anticompetitive reduction in output or service. And 
importantly, the efficiencies defense, because it is aimed at 
rebutting the Government’s prima facie case that the merger 
is anticompetitive, must “demonstrate that the prima facie 
case portrays inaccurately the merger’s probable effects on 
competition.” St. Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 790 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). The District Court 
analyzed several claimed efficiencies and concluded that they 
weigh in favor of denying the preliminary injunction. But it 
did not address whether those claimed efficiencies meet the 
demanding scrutiny that the efficiencies defense requires.9 
Our review of the Hospitals’ claimed efficiencies leads 
us to conclude that they are insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of anticompetitiveness. With respect to the 
Hospitals’ capacity constraints and capital savings claims, the 
District Court found that the merger will alleviate Hershey’s 
                                              
9 The District Court engaged in an analysis of what it 
called “equities,” even though it held that the Government 
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. 
But after articulating the standard for weighing the equities as 
required by Section 7, the District Court immediately 
articulated the standard for the efficiencies defense. App. 16-
17. It then, in its discussion of the equities, considered the 
Hospitals’ claims that: (1) the proposed merger would 
alleviate Hershey’s capacity constraints, App. 17-23; (2) 
repositioning by competitors will constrain prices at Hershey 
and Pinnacle, App. 23-25; (3) the merger will increase the 
Hospitals’ ability to adapt to risk-based contracting, App. 25-
27; and (4) the public interest will be served by the merger, 
App. 27-28. 
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capacity constraints because, upon consummating the merger, 
Hershey will immediately be able to transfer patients to 
Pinnacle. The District Court also credited the testimony of 
Hershey CEO Craig Hillemeier that, because Hershey will 
transfer patients to Pinnacle, it can avoid constructing a new 
planned bed tower aimed at providing additional beds at 
Hershey, resulting in capital savings of nearly $277 million.  
The parties dispute whether capital savings can 
constitute efficiencies. Compare FTC v. Butterworth Health 
Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1300-01 (W.D. Mich. 1996) 
(capital savings are cognizable efficiencies), with FTC v. 
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-47, 2011 WL 
1219281, at *36-37 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (capital 
savings are not cognizable efficiencies). We turn to the 
Merger Guidelines in answering this question. As the Merger 
Guidelines explain, competition is what “usually spurs firms 
to achieve efficiencies internally.” Merger Guidelines, § 10, 
at 29. One of the rationales for recognizing the efficiencies 
defense is that a merger may produce efficiencies that “result 
in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new 
products.” Id. Thus, although capital savings, in and of 
themselves, would not be cognizable efficiencies, we can 
foresee that an antitrust defendant could demonstrate that its 
avoidance of capital expenditures would benefit the public by, 
for example, lowering prices or improving the quality of its 
services. In such a case, so long as the capital savings result 
in some tangible, verifiable benefit to consumers, capital 
savings may play a role in our efficiencies analysis.  
Our recognition that capital savings are cognizable 
efficiencies does not decide this issue, however, because even 
if capital savings are efficiencies, they must nonetheless be 
verifiable and must not result in any anticompetitive 
reduction in output. It is on these requirements that the 
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Hospitals’ efficiencies claim fails. As an initial matter, we are 
bound to accept the District Court’s findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. And, as the District Court 
observed, we do not second guess the business judgments of 
Hershey’s able executives. We do, however, require that the 
Hospitals provide clear evidence showing that the merger will 
result in efficiencies that will offset the anticompetitive 
effects and ultimately benefit consumers. First, the evidence 
is ambiguous at best that Hershey needed to construct a 100-
bed tower to alleviate its capacity constraints. The Hospitals’ 
own efficiencies analysis shows that Hershey needs only 
thirteen additional beds in order to operate at 85% capacity, 
which is a hospital’s optimal occupancy rate. App. 18; 
Corrected Reply Br. 28 n.18. Second, Hershey’s ability to 
forego building the 100-bed tower is a reduction in output. 
The Merger Guidelines expressly indicate that the FTC will 
not consider efficiencies that “arise from anticompetitive 
reductions in output or service.” Merger Guidelines, § 10, at 
30.  
Even if we were to agree with the Hospitals that their 
ability to forego building a new 100-bed tower as a result of 
the merger is a cognizable efficiency that is verified, merger 
specific, and did not arise from any anticompetitive reduction 
in output, we cannot overlook that the HHI numbers here 
eclipse any others we have identified in similar cases. They 
render this combination not only presumptively 
anticompetitive, but so likely to be anticompetitive that 
“extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies [are] necessary 
to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive.” Id. § 10, 
at 31. This high standard is not met here—nor, we note, has 
this high standard been met by any proposed efficiencies 
considered by a court of appeals. 
Second, the Hospitals claim that the merger will 
40 
 
enhance their efforts to engage in risk-based contracting. 
Risk-based contracting is an alternative payment model to the 
traditional fee-for-service model in which healthcare 
providers bear some of the financial risk and upside in the 
cost of treatment.10 The Hospitals’ expert testified that large 
systems that control the entire continuum of care are better 
suited to risk-based contracting, partly because they are able 
to spread out the financial risk involved. App. 26. The 
Government disputes that a system as large as the combined 
Hershey/Pinnacle system has any advantages over a smaller, 
albeit still large, healthcare system. Gov’t Br. 53; Corrected 
Reply Br. 29. The District Court seemingly agreed with the 
Government that both Pinnacle and Hershey are capable of 
independently operating under the risk-based contracting 
model. App. 26. But it found that the merger will be 
beneficial to the Hospitals’ ability to engage in risk-based 
contracting, which in turn will allow Hershey “to continue to 
use its revenue to operate its College of Medicine and draw 
high-quality medical students and professors into the region.” 
Id. 
Irrespective of whatever benefits the merger may 
bestow upon the Hospitals in increasing their ability to 
                                              
10 In risk-based contracting, healthcare providers bear 
some financial risk and share in the financial upside based on 
the quality and value of the services they provide. Consider 
the following hypothetical example: A payor would pay the 
hospital $300 per member per month to care for a member. If 
the patient is generally in good health and goes to the doctor 
once per year, the hospital still receives the $300/month 
payment and can keep the excess. But if the patient is sick 
and requires much more expensive treatment, the hospital still 
receives only $300/month and must bear the excess cost. 
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engage in risk-based contracting, the Hospitals must 
demonstrate that such a benefit would ultimately be passed on 
to consumers. It is not clear from the record how this would 
be so beyond the mere assertion that it would save the 
Hospitals money and such savings would be passed on to 
consumers. We cannot credit the District Court’s observation 
that, because of the benefits to risk-based contracting, 
Hershey will be able to continue to use its revenue to operate 
its College of Medicine and draw high-quality medical 
students and professors to Hershey. An efficiencies analysis 
requires more than speculative assurances that a benefit 
enjoyed by the Hospitals will also be enjoyed by the public. It 
is similarly unclear how this ability to engage in risk-based 
contracting will counteract any of the anticompetitive effects 
of the merger. Finally, the District Court’s finding that both 
Pinnacle and Hershey are capable of independently engaging 
in risk-based contracting contravenes its conclusion that this 
is a cognizable efficiency because the benefit is not merger 
specific. See H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 722 (the efficiencies 
must not be achievable by either company alone; otherwise, 
the merger’s benefits could be achieved without the loss of a 
competitor). 
b. Anticompetitive Effects 
 In an attempt to show that the merger will not, despite 
high HHI numbers, produce anticompetitive effects, the 
Hospitals claim that repositioning—the response by 
competitors to offer close substitutes offered by the merging 
firms—will be sufficient to constrain post-merger prices. The 
Merger Guidelines recognize that, in certain cases, 
repositioning by other competitors may be sufficient to deter 
or counteract the anticompetitive effects of a merger. Merger 
Guidelines, § 6.1, at 22. In evaluating repositioning, the 
Merger Guidelines call for consideration of “timeliness, 
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likelihood, and sufficiency.” Id. The District Court noted that 
“the market that Hershey and Pinnacle exist within has 
already been subject to extensive repositioning.” App. 23. It 
specifically noted that Geisinger Health System recently 
acquired Holy Spirit Hospital near Harrisburg; WellSpan 
Health acquired Good Samaritan Hospital in Lebanon 
County; the University of Pennsylvania acquired Lancaster 
General Hospital in Lancaster County; and Community 
Health Systems acquired Carlisle Regional Hospital in 
Cumberland County. App. 24. We agree that these recent 
affiliations and acquisitions, at least in the Harrisburg area, 
assuage some of the concerns that the proposed combination 
will have anticompetitive effects. We do not believe, 
however, that repositioning by these hospitals would have the 
ability to constrain post-merger prices, as evidenced by the 
extensive testimony by payors that “there would be no 
network” without Hershey and Pinnacle.  
We therefore conclude that the Hospitals have not 
rebutted the Government’s prima facie case that the merger is 
likely to be anticompetitive. Accordingly, we hold that the 
Government has carried its burden to demonstrate that it is 
likely to succeed on the merits. 
B. Weighing the Equities 
“Although the [Government’s] showing of likelihood 
of success creates a presumption in favor of preliminary 
injunctive relief, we must still weigh the equities in order to 
decide whether enjoining the merger would be in the public 
interest.” H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 726; see 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
The question is whether the harm that the Hospitals will 
suffer if the merger is delayed will, in turn, harm the public 
more than if the injunction is not issued. See Univ. Health, 
938 F.2d at 1225. Once we determine that the proposed 
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merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, the 
Hospitals “face a difficult task in justifying the nonissuance 
of a preliminary injunction.” Id. 
Although the statute mandates that we weigh the 
“equities,” it is silent as to what specifically those equities 
are. The prevailing view is that, although private equities may 
be considered, they are not to be afforded great weight. See 
id. (“While it is proper to consider private equities in deciding 
whether to enjoin a particular transaction, we must afford 
such concerns little weight.”); H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 727 
n.25 (same). But see FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 
1339, 1346 (4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., sitting alone) (“All of 
these reasons go to the private injury which may result from 
an injunction … . [T]hey are not proper considerations for 
granting or withholding injunctive relief under § 13(b).”). 
Because private equities are afforded little weight, they 
cannot outweigh effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. 
FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (Ginsburg, J.). Thus, although we may consider private 
equities in our weighing of the equities, wherever the 
Government “demonstrates a likelihood of ultimate success, a 
countershowing of private equities alone would not suffice to 
justify denial of a preliminary injunction barring the merger.” 
Id. 
“The principal equity weighing in favor of issuance of 
the injunction is the public’s interest in effective enforcement 
of the antitrust laws.” Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1225. The 
purpose of Section 13(b) is to preserve the status quo and 
allow the FTC to adjudicate the anticompetitive effects of the 
proposed merger in the first instance. Food Town Stores, 539 
F.2d at 1342. This factor is particularly important here 
because should the Hospitals consummate the merger and the 
FTC subsequently determine that it is unlawful, divestiture 
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would be the FTC’s only remedy. At that point, since it is 
extraordinarily difficult to “unscramble the egg,” Univ. 
Health, 938 F.2d at 1217 n.23,11 “it will be too late to 
preserve competition if no preliminary injunction has issued.” 
H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 727; see Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 
1225. 
On the other side, the Hospitals claim that granting the 
injunction would “preclude the many public benefits 
recognized by the [district] court.” Hosps. Br. 49.  In making 
this argument, the Hospitals misconstrue our equities inquiry. 
By statute, we are required to weigh the equities in order to 
decide whether granting the injunction would be in the public 
interest. In answering this question, therefore, we consider 
whether the injunction, not the merger, would be in the public 
interest.  
 Mindful of the limited scope of our inquiry, we 
believe that the injunction will not deprive the public of the 
many benefits found by the District Court. All of the 
Hospitals’ alleged benefits will still be available upon 
consummation of the merger, even if we were to grant an 
                                              
11 Although the District Court was correct that it may 
not be impossible to order divestiture, courts have repeatedly 
recognized that it is difficult to do so, especially considering 
the practical implications of denying the preliminary 
injunction request. For instance, upon consummating the 
merger, the Hospitals will presumably share confidential 
information and begin transferring patients from Hershey to 
Pinnacle. Should the FTC adjudication determine that the 
merger is unlawful, the FTC will be tasked with divorcing the 
Hospitals’ now-shared confidential information and forcing 
patients to return to Hershey. These practical difficulties 
cannot be written off so easily. 
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injunction and the FTC were to subsequently determine the 
merger is lawful. Although the Hospitals have indicated in 
their briefs to this Court that they “‘would have to abandon 
the combination rather than continu[e] to expend substantial 
resources litigating’ if an injunction is issued,” Hosps. Br. 49 
(quoting Hosps. Pre-Hrg. Br. 2), they offer no support beyond 
mere recitation that they would do so. Even more, the District 
Court made the exact opposite finding below. See App. 27 
(“[W]e note that the parties have not emphasized, and we do 
not credit, any argument that an injunction would kill this 
merger … .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Nevertheless, even accepting the Hospitals’ assertion 
that they would abandon the merger following issuance of the 
injunction, the result—that the public would be denied the 
procompetitive advantages of the merger—would be the 
Hospitals’ doing. We see no reason why, if the merger makes 
economic sense now, it would not be equally sensible to 
consummate the merger following a FTC adjudication on the 
merits that finds the merger lawful.  
On balance, the equities favor granting the injunction. 
None of the private equities, or those equities that may have 
public benefit, on the Hospitals’ side of the ledger are 
sufficient to overcome the public’s strong interest in effective 
enforcement of the antitrust laws. We recognize that certain 
extrinsic factors have made these types of mergers 
beneficial—perhaps even necessary—to the continued 
success of some hospital systems. Yet, in this case, we are 
tasked with deciding only whether preliminary injunctive 
relief would be in the public interest. Opining on the 
soundness of any legislative policy that may have compelled 
the Hospitals to undertake this merger is not within our 
purview.  
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V. Conclusion 
We therefore conclude that, after determining the 
Government’s likelihood of success and weighing the 
equities, a preliminary injunction would be in the public 
interest. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s 
denial of the Government’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction. We will also remand the case and direct the 
District Court to preliminarily enjoin the proposed merger 
between Hershey and Pinnacle pending the outcome of the 
FTC’s administrative adjudication. 
